It is known that there may not exist any stable matching for a given instance of the stable roommates problem. A stable partition is a structure that generalizes the notion of a stable matching; Tan (1991) proved that every instance of the stable roommates problem contains at least one such structure. In this paper we propose a new algorithm for finding a stable partition, and hence a new algorithm for finding a stable matching if one exists. Our algorithm processes the problem dynamically as long as certain relative preference orders are maintained. Some theoretical results about stable partitions are also presented.
Introduction
The stable roommates problem has been the subject of much research in recent years. This problem involves matching n people into n/2 disjoint pairs to achieve a certain type of stability. Such a matching is called "a complete stable matching". However, it is known [1, 5] that there may exist no complete stable matching for a given instance of the stable roommates problem. Irving [3] proposed an 0(n2) algorithm that finds a complete stable matching or confirms that none exists. Recently Gusfield and Irving [2] listed over a hundred research papers related to this problem. Much of the recent research concerning this problem is explicitly or implicitly subject to one or both of the following restrictions: (i) The discussion assumes that there exists at least one complete stable matching.
(ii) The preference lists are static. In other words, the entire preference lists are given beforehand.
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In a recent paper [6] , Tan established a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a complete stable matching. Toward that end, he defined a new structure, called "a stable partition", that is a generalization of the notion of a stable matching, and proved that every instance of the stable roommates problem contains at least one such structure.
In this paper, we treat the problem by relaxing the above two restrictions, and instead of finding a complete stable matching, which may not exist, we look for the more general structure, a stable partition. Our approach in a sense extends that of Itoga [4] , which considers the bipartite case (the stable marriage problem), while ours considers the non-bipartite case (the stable roommates problem). Our approach leads to the following results:
(i) Our algorithm processes the problem on line, i.e., the preference lists are allowed to expand dynamically as long as certain relative preference orders are maintained. (ii) We introduce a new algorithm to find a stable partition, and hence a new algorithm to find a complete stable matching if one exists. (iii) We give a new proof of the known fact [6] that there exists at least one stable partition for every instance of the stable roommates problem. (iv) We obtain some theoretical properties of stable partitions that are interesting in their own right.
Definitions
In this section, we state the stable roommates problem and recall the definition of a stable partition introduced by Tan [6] . There is a set S of n people. Each person i has a preference list consisting of a subset Si of S -( '> z an a rank ordering (most preferred d first) of the persons in Si. For person i, the subset Si includes all of the persons he is willing to be matched with. A preference relation R is defined to be a pair (S, T) , where S is a set of n persons and Tis the table of preference lists of these n people. A complete matching M is a partition of the n persons into n/2 disjoint pairs of roommates such that for every pair (a, b} in M, a is on b's list and b is on a's list. A complete matching M is unstable if there are two persons who are not matched together, but each of whom prefers the other to his mate in the matching. A complete matching which is not unstable is called a stable matching. The stable roommates problem, as originally stated [l, 51, is to find a complete stable matching. It is known that there may exist no complete stable matching. A stable partition is a structure that generalizes the notion of a complete stable matching; Tan [6] proved that every preference relation contains at least one such structure. We now introduce it.
Let T be a table of preference lists. If person b is on the preference list of person a, then we write (a 1 b) to denote the entry b on u's preference list. We define r(u Given a preference relation (S, T), a stable partition ZZ of (S, T) consists of a partition of the set S; S = u!" 1 Ai, Ai n Aj = 0 if i #j, and a specified semi-party permutation IZ(Ai) for each Ai In the context of the above definition, the associated semi-party permutation II is called a party permutation for Ai, and each Ai is called a party. An odd party (respectively, even party) is a party having odd (respectively, even) cardinality. More precisely, these terms are defined with respect to the given stable partition Il. If there are ambiguities, we will say that Ai is a party in II (or a n-party), (a ) b) is a superior entry in II (or a n-superior entry), and so on.
A stable partition n is specified by its party permutations and will be denoted by n = {~(~,M&),~(~,), .**, Z7(A,)}. Persons a and b are said to be a matching pair (or matched) in D if {a, b) forms a 2-person party in ZI. A subset A of the all-person set S is said to form a party (respectively, an odd party) if there exists a stable partition n such that A is a party (respectively, an odd party) in Ii'.
We give the following example to illustrate the above definitions. A preference relation may have more than one stable partition. We can identify at least two other stable partitions in the above example: n, = ((1,2), (3, 4) , (5,6), (7,8,9,10,11>, (12)) and n, = {(2,3), (4,1>, <5,6), (7,g,9,10,11>, (12)).
As one can see, all three of these stable partitions contain the same odd parties. Tan [6] proved that every preference relation contains at least one stable partition, and that any two stable partitions contain the same odd parties. Therefore the existence of an odd party depends on the preference relation, and not on a particular stable partition. In the following, we cite some results from [6] that are relevant here.
As stated in [6] , the notion of a stable partition is a generalization of that of a complete stable matching in the following sense. Proof. Suppose that ZI is a stable partition without any odd party. Let A be an even party in n with party permutation (at, a2, u3, . . . , azk), k 2 2. Then by decomposing party A into k matching pairs (u1,a2), (a3, a,), . . . , (azk _ 1, azk). we have a new stable partition n' = (n -((ai, az, . . . , &}) u {(al, az), (u3, a,), . . ., (azk-1, a&}. This is because every superior entry in II' is a superior entry in n, and every inferior entry in n, other than the party entries, is an inferior entry in n'. By continuing to decompose any even party having cardinality 4 or more, we eventually obtain a stable partition in which every party has cardinality two. 0
Proposition 2.3 (Tan [6]). Given an instance of the stable roommates problem, there exists a complete stable matching if and only if there exists no odd party.

Proposal-rejection alternating sequence
Let R = (S, T) be a preference relation, and let a ES. We define the deletion of person a from R, denoted by R -a, to be the preference relation (S', r'), where S' = S -{a}, and T' is the table of preference lists obtained from T by deleting the preference list of person a and the entries ( Let us consider the following situation. Suppose that we have already found a stable partition 17 for preference relation R = (S, T) (note that for JS( = 1 or 2 a stable partition is immediately at hand), and one additional person a is then added to the relation. The question then arises whether there is a stable partition for the enlarged preference relation R + a. If the answer is yes, another natural question is how to find this partition. Is it necessary to start all over again, or is there a way of augmenting the current stable partition to incorporate the new person? Tan [6] proved that every preference relation contains at least one stable partition. Therefore, the answer to the first question is affirmative. However, the proof in [6] is quite long and complicated. In this paper we propose a new algorithm and a new proof that resolve both questions. The basic idea behind our algorithm is that of "adding one person at a time". For ease of exposition, let us define the following terms.
Let R = (S, 7') be a preference relation and let a0 ES. Given a stable partition no of R -zo, a sequence of persons txo,/?r, car, b2, CI~, . The motivation for this definition is as follows. Consider person uk and stable partition nk for R -@& (see Fig. 1 ). One may think of c(k as being out of the relation initially. To incorporate this person into a stable partition, let tlk propose to others successively in the order of his preference list, until either there is someone x who finds that (x ( elk) is flk-superior and accepts &, or everyone rejects &. There are three cases, as follows.
(i) ak is rejected by every person on his list, i.e., (x ) ak) is nk-inferior for every x on c(k's ht. Then ak by himself forms an odd party, and nk u {(cl,&)} is a stable partition for R.
In case (ii) and (iii), there is someone who accepts c(k. Let x be the first one on &'s list who finds that (x I&) is nk-superior.
(ii) If x is currently in a flk-Odd party, say (al, a2, . .., a2,,,, x), then this odd party is decomposed and nk+ 1 = (l7, -((al, a2,. .., a2,,x)}) u {(al, a2), (a3, ad), . . . ,
is a stable partition for R. (iii) Suppose that x is currently in a nk-even party. In view of Proposition 2.2, we may assume that x is currently in a nk-even party of size 2, say (x, y). Given the preference table shown above, if person 5 is deleted from the table, 170 = ( (172) (374)) .
IS a stable partition for the remaining persons. Then the following diagram is an alternating sequence starting from person 5.
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Let us discuss some properties of the alternating sequence. Proof. By the definition of an alternating sequence, (ii) is trivial; this is because bi is matched with ai in II;_ 1 and (pi ) ai-1) is ni _ r-superior. TO prove part (i), we observe that if r(ai 1 X) < r(Mi ) pi), then (ai ( X) is ITi_ l-superior. SO (X ( ai) is I7i_ r-inferior and it is still IZi-inferior, since ZIi = (IZi_ 1 -{(ai,fii)}) u {(ai_ r,bi)}. Considering the stable partition ZZi for preference relation R -ai, when ai proposes to the other persons in the order of his list, anyone before Bi in a;s list will not accept his proposal. Therefore the first person who accepts ails proposal, pi + 1, must be behind Bi. This proves (i). 0
The above result (i) implies that anyone who is rejected by another person can participate in the proposing process by continuing down his list of choices. Proof. Suppose not. Take j, and io such that j, < io, Bj,, = LX~~, Bj # pj, for all jo<jdio,andcri#cci,forallj,di<i 0. By the definition of an alternating sequence, we know that j, # iO, aj,_ r and pi, are matched together in Z7j0, and they are still together in n,_ 1. However, Bj, ( = Glio) is left unmatched in II,. SO pi0 = t4i, _ 1, which is a contradiction, and the result follows. 0
Given an alternating sequence ao,pI, ccr, . . ../lk. &., if Bj # ai for all i < j, then by Propositions 3.1 and 3.2, each ai gets an increasingly worse partner as the alternating sequence continues, while each pj gets an increasingly better partner. Each person has at most n -1 entries in his list. Therefore within 0(n2) steps, one of the following three cases occurs.
(i) ak proposes to the others but no one accepts his proposal.
(ii) There is a person who accepts ak)s proposal, and the first such person is currently in a nk-odd party. (iii) The first person who accepts ak's proposal, say Bk + r, is in a flk-even party and P k+l = ai for some 0 < i < k -1. As discussed before, in cases (i) and (ii), the alternating sequence terminates and a stable partition for preference relation R = (S, T) has been found. Before discussing case (iii), we need some further definitions.
Definition. Let ao, PI, al, . . ., j$, ak, /$ + 1, ak + 1 be an alternating sequence. If /$ + 1 = C& for some 0 6 i < k -1, then we say that the alternating sequence has a return at Pk+ r. Let i. be the largest index, 0 < i. < k -1, such that Bk + 1 = aio. Then we say the sequence at &+ 1 returns to i. (or returns to ai,,, if there is no ambiguity). The subsequence ai,,, pi,,+ 1, ai,,+ 1, . . . , Ijk,akr/$+l is said to be the return sequence corresponding to /&+ 1, or simply a return sequence.
When considering the subsequence starting from tlior we may assume that the first return sequence is that starting from ao.
Definition. Let ao, PI, aI, . .., Pk, ak, Bk+ 1 be a return sequence. The length of this return sequence is defined to be 2k + 1. Now let us return to case (iii), in which the alternating sequence has a return at fik + r. Following the method of extending the alternating sequence described before, we have the following result. We shall prove the above theorem in the next section. In the remainder of this section, we investigate some properties of return sequences and give a new proof of the fact that there exists a stable partition for every preference relation. 
Proposition3.4.
Proof. (i) This follows directly from the definition and Proposition 3.2.
(ii) Since a0 and fil are matched together in II,, they remain together in nk, but not in flk+l, So ak+l =bl.
(iii) Observe that &+ 1 ( = PI) and a1 are matched together in ZI,. al gets an increasingly worse partner from Ho to nk + i. When c(k+ 1 ( = PI) makes a proposal, aI certainly takes c(k + 1 as a II k + 1-superior entry. So, in ak + i's list, there must be someone before al (or equal to at) who accepts a k + 1. Let the first person who accepts tlk+ i's proposal be x; thus (x 1 tlk+ 1) is flk+ i-superior. If x # aI, then r(&+ i 1 x) < r(ak+ 1 I aI). so (ak + 1 ) x) is no-superior, and (X ) a k + 1) iS no-inferior. Person X takes tlk + i as inferior in II,, but as superior in 171, + i, therefore x has a worse partner in nk+ 1 than he has in II,. By Propositions 3.1 and 3.2, x = ai for some 1 < i < k, and this completes the proof. 0 With the above definitions and discussion, we are able to give a new proof of the fact that every preference relation contains at least one stable partition and to explore some new properties of the stable partition. The proof is inductive and will lead to an algorithm for finding a stable partition, but we shall not worry about the efficiency of the algorithm until later.
Let R = (S, T) be a preference relation. Suppose that we have already found a stable partition II, for preference relation R -q,. Starting from ao, an alternating sequence is generated. As discussed before, if the sequence cco,fil, al, . . . . fik,ak terminates at some point ak, either because that there is no one to accept ak, or because the first person who accepts ak is in a ZI,-odd party, then a stable partition for preference relation R is found. Suppose that the sequence extends infinitely; by the finiteness of the problem, eVentUally &, = c& and flk, = flkz for some kI < kZ. Then the sequence cycles, and so does the associated sequence of stable partitions. Without loss of generality, we may assume that CI~ = a, and Ii', = Il,. 
_., c~~,J?~,~~) forms an odd party, and Zl = (II, -((ori,&) (i = 1 to k>)u (A) is a stable partition for preference relation R.
Proof. (i) It is obvious that the alternating sequence cycles with pattern ~o,Pr,%, . . ../&I. m c1 = ao, and that the sequence must have a return at some point, say at pi. Suppose that the return sequence corresponding to bj starts at element Cli. Then we claim that the return sequence corresponding to the next element Bj+ 1 starts at Cli+ r. For otherwise, the length of the return sequence strictly decreases, contradicting the fact that the alternating sequence cycles. Since the sequence cycles, every Cli is the starting point of a return sequence. So (i) follows.
(ii) Consider the alternating sequence ao, /?r,ccl, . . . ,Bkr ak, Bk+ 1, ak+ 1, . . . . The first return occurs at &+ r, and it returns to ao. Then, as proved in part (i), at each pkij it returns to aj-1, so Pk+j = @j-l for all j 2 1. By Proposition 3.4, we know that c(k+j = Bj (See Fig. 2 Note that a0 # ai and @o # pi for 1 < i < k. Therefore, by the definition of a return sequence and by the fact that the sequence cycles, it is easy to verify the following facts: forms a semi-party permutation. We now need to show that A is an odd party in ZZ, when n = (no -{( fii, CYJ 1 i = 1 to k}) u {A}. To do this, we only have to show that II is stable. Suppose not. Since ZIo is stable, then any instability must involve some Cli or /3) Because the alternating sequence cycles, without loss of generality, we may assume that person a0 causes instability. So there is a person x such that both (a0 1 x) and (x 1 ao) are H-superior. Note that (a0 1 x) is n-superior if and only if r(ao 1 x) < r(cto 1 PI). In light of the stable partitions ZZ, and Lr, and the definition of an alternating sequence, x can only be some Mi or pi, for some i = 1 to k. We claim that x cannot be any of the PUS, nor any of the CLi's, and this will give a contradiction. First we consider the stable partition n1 in which rxo is matched with /I1 and each Bi is matched with C(i for i = 2 to k. If (a0 I pi) is H-superior, i.e., n,-superior, then (/Ii I cto) is ZI,-inferior, i.e., n-inferior. So x # fii for i = 2 to k, and obviously x # pi. Second, let us consider the stable partition Lrk: txo is matched with /?r, and each cli is matched with pi+ 1, for i = 1 to k -1. If (~0 I Cli) is n-superior, i.e., I7,-superior, then (ai 1 ao) is ZI,-inferior, i.e. U-inferior. Thus x # Cli, for i = 1 to k -1, and clearly x # c(~. This shows that Lr is stable and the theorem follows. 0
From the previous discussion and Theorem 3.7, by adding one person at a time and by a simple induction, we establish the following fact, first proved in [6] . Corollary 3.8. There exists a stable partition for every preference relation.
We also have the following new observation. (ii) when it decreases by 1, one of the existing odd parties is eliminated, and all the rest remain in the new relation.
It can be shown that deleting one person from the relation has the same effect on the number of odd parties. An immediate consequence of these results is the following theorem, first proved in [6] . Proof. Suppose not. Let IZ, and ZZ, be two stable partitions having ml and m2 odd parties, respectively, where ml < m 2. Deleting one person from each odd party in ZI, results in a stable partition Il; without any odd party. Deleting the same set of persons from IZ, results in a stable partition I7; with at least m2 -ml odd parties; this is because deleting one person reduces the number of odd parties by at most 1. So, without loss of generality, we may assume that m, = 0 and mz > 0. By Proposition 2.2, we may also assume that each even party in IZ, has cardinality two. Hence IZr is a complete stable matching.
Let S be the set of persons whose partners in ZI, are superior entries in lZ2, and let I be the set of persons whose partners in IT, are inferior entries in Z12. For the stability of U2, every person in S has a III-partner in I. So ISI < 111. Consider a party A in stable partition II,, and let (aI, az, . . . . ak) be the associated party permutation of A. For the stability of II,, no two consecutive persons ai and ai+ 1 (subscripts modulo k) can be in I, otherwise ai and ai+ 1 block the matching II,.
Therefore, if A is an odd party in 112, then IAnSj >IAnll.
And if A is an even party in 112, then
IAnSI > [AnIl.
Since stable partition Z7, contains at least one odd party, we have
Ai is a party
Ai is a party in II, in II,
This is a contradiction, and the theorem follows. 0
The above result also indicates that, using the alternating sequence approach, no matter which of the stable partitions for a given preference relation is used as the starting point, introducing a new person always leads to the same outcome, either the introduction of a new odd party or the elimination of an existing one. By Corollary 3.8 and Theorem 3.10, we may conclude the known fact [6] that there exists a complete stable matching if and only if there does not exist any odd party. One application of Corollary 3.9 is as follows. Suppose we know that a given preference relation does not contain a complete stable matching, and we wish to know the minimum number of persons that must be added to (deleted from) the relation so that the resulting instance contains a complete stable matching. By Corollary 3.9, this minimum number is the number of odd parties. This is because adding (deleting) one person into (from) the relation reduces the number of odd parties by at most 1, and no complete stable matching exists as long as there are odd parties. On the other hand, suppose the number of odd parties is m. It is then a simple matter to add (delete) m persons into (from) the relation so as to decompose all the odd parties.
Locating an odd party
Theorem 3.7 in the previous section does not provide us with an efficient way to locate the odd party it describes. In this section, we will discuss how to identify the odd party algorithmically and examine the time complexity of the algorithm involved. As a result, we will establish Theorem 3.3. Below we provide some more definitions and describe further properties of return sequences.
LetS:Clg,/jl,CI1,...,Bk,ak,Pk+lb e a return sequence, and let x be a person involved in this sequence, i.e., x = Cli or pi for some i. During the course of this sequence starting from a0 and ending at /Ik + r, sometimes person x has a matched partner and sometimes he does not. We define Worsts(x) to be the worst person in x's list with whom x has been matched during the course of sequence S. Proof. By Propositions 3.1 and 3.2, each Cli receives an increasingly worse partner, while each pi receives an increasingly better partner in the process of S, i = 1 to k. So (i) and (iii) follow. For part (ii), since S is a return sequence with jIk + 1 = cto, a0 has only been matched with pi and LYE in no and Uk + i, respectively, and r(ao 1 ak) < r(ozO 1 /Ii). So Worsts(cco) = bl. 0
Consider an altering sequence tlo, pi, c(~, . . ., /$, elk, . . . . Suppose that there is a return at flk+ i. By Proposition 3.4, there is another return at flkfZ. The return at fik+ 2 is said to be the next return (subsequent to the return at Pk + i), and the corresponding return sequence is called the next return sequence. (ii) Worsts,(x) is no worse than WorstSl(x), for every person x in Sz, i.e., r(x I Worst,,(x)) G r(x 1 Worst,,(x)).
Proof. (i) By Proposition 3.4, ak+ 1 = PI and /I k+ 2 = C(i for some 1 < i < k, hence the result is trivial.
(ii) Let n,,ZZ,, . . . . nk, ZZk + 1 be the corresponding stable partitions. Then the next return sequence Sz starts from Cli, for some 1 < i < k. So C (~, bi+I,ai+ I where &+i = /I1 and bk+2 = ai. The only stable partition that appears in Sz but not in Si is nk+2, and the only difference between nk+Z and nk+ 1 is the changes in the matching status among uk+ 1 ( = PI), /&+ 2 ( = c(i), and &+ 2 ( = pi+ 1). Person & + 2 is out of the relation in nk+ 2 and is not matched with anyone. By Proposition 3.1, person /&+ z has a better partner in nk+ 2 than he has in nk+ i. So the result holds for x = Mk+ 2 and for x = /Ik + 2. Person & + 1 ( = PI) is matched with cli (respectively, CIJ in flk + 2 (respectively, in n,). By Proposition 3.4, r(c ( k + 1 ( cli) d r(uk+ 1 1 aI) , SO the result also holds for x = &+I. 0
Consider an alternating sequence. Suppose that a return occurs; by Corollary 3.6, the alternating sequence can be extended infinitely. Nevertheless, we have the following properties. (ii) By the definition of a return sequence and by Proposition 3.2, we have fik+ 1 = cl0 and Bj # C(i for all 0 d i 6 k, 1 < j d k. In the initial stable partition no, it is obvious that a "p' person is matched with an "c? person. Now suppose, to the contrary, that for a certain i and j, 1 6 i 6 k, 1 < j < k and i # j, Bi and Bj are matched together in a certain step of the alternating sequence. By Proposition 4.1, each /Ii is matched with Worsts(&) in no. Then both pi and Bj would prefer each other to their partner in the initial stable partition no, which is a contradiction. q Proof of Theorem 3.3. Let 01~, pi, al , . . . , j$, ctk be an alternating sequence with a return at /$+i. Then c(k must be the starting point of a return sequence as the alternating sequence goes on.
Suppose not. Without loss of generality, we may assume that a0 is the starting point of the return at /$+ r. Then at fi k+ 2, the sequence returns to Mi, for some 1 d i < k. As the alternating sequence goes on, let m be the largest index, with m < k, such that u, is the starting point of a return sequence. Therefore, at a certain step /j4+i, the alternating sequence rxo,/I1, al, . . . . pm, c1,, . . . returns to c(,, and at /?4+2, it returns to one of ~k+l,c(k+z,...,xq. Note that clq+l is matched with /?,+z in ZZ4+2. However, Remark. In the context of the last paragraph, it is not difficult to give an example in which any return sequence starting from an element before ak does not constitute an odd party.
Given a preference relation R and given a stable partition of R, to add a new participant a0 into R and find a new stable partition incorporating this new person, we generate an alternating sequence starting from ao. Within 0(n2) steps, either the alternating sequence terminates with a larger stable partition for R + ao, or a return occurs. Suppose that the first return occurs at /I k + 1. Then by extending the alternating sequence from ak, we will locate a new odd party within at most O(n') steps as stated in Theorem 3.3, and obtain a stable partition for R + go.
Conclusions
In this paper, we propose a new algorithm for finding a stable partition for a given instance of the stable roommates problem, and therefore a new algorithm for finding a stable matching if one exists. Our algorithm processes the problem dynamically, by allowing new participants to join the relation. In its present form, the algorithm considers the addition of only one person at a time, but we believe that the idea on which the algorithm is based can be extended to handle the case of inserting a set of persons at a time. The new participants would be processed in batch form, which might enhance the efficiency of the algorithm. This is an issue worthy of further study.
